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CASENOTE
Expanding Title VII's Exemption for Seniority Systems: American Tobacco Company v.
Patterson' — Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2
 (the Act) is a broad remedial
statute seeking to prohibit. all forms of employment practices which discriminate on the
basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 3 On its face, Title VII
prohibits intentionally discriminatory employment practices.' In addition, judicial in-
terpretation of the Act has established that it also proscribes t hose employment practices
which are neutral on their face and in intent if they operate in a discriminatory manner.'
Congress recognized in drafting the Act, however, that blind pursuit of a policy of
eradicating discriminatory employment. practices may unnecessarily disturb the interests
of innocent employees." Members of Congress were particularly concerned that Title VII
might disturb the rights and expectations of non-minorities under seniority systems: 7
 In
recognition of this, Congress afforded some measure of immunity to bona fide seniority
systems in section 703(h) of the Act. 8
' 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3
 i nternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Brennan,
dissenting).
4 Section 703 of the Act provides:
(a) 11 shall be an unlawful employment practice lOr an employer —
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment. practice for a labor organization —
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership ... [on the basis of an] individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). The Court stated: "Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their lace, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
Id.
6
 International Brotherhood of 'teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350 (1977); see also
infra notes 42-56 and ;WO )mpanying text.
7 See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text discussing the legislative history of section 703(h).
Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
provides in its entirety:
Not w;thmanding any other prtIvisinn of this subchapter, it shall not he an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, nor shall it he unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shalt not
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter Iir any employer to differ-
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Seniority systems have long been viewed as essential for providing objective stan-
dards by which to determine order of layoffs and recall, promotions, and distribution of
benefits, thus providing protection from arbitrary management decisions." In addition,
seniority systems provide a mechanism which enables employees to assess their vulnerabil-
ity to layoffs relative to that of their coworkers, thus providing for job security and
stability." Use of seniority as a criterion for distributing employment benefits may,
however. serve to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." For example, those
employees who were denied access to certain positions in the past on the basis of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin will have less accrued seniority than their fellow
employees who laced no such discriminatory barriers in hiring and promotion decisions.
Consequently, in times of economic recession and layoffs, minorities and women may find
that employment positions opened to them by Tide VII will he lost under last-hired,
first-fired provisions commonly embodied in seniority systems.' Similarly, in those indus-
tries which utilize departmental, _job, or line seniority systems under which seniority is
measured by length of service within a particular department, job, or line of progression
rather than by o ntal length of service with an employer," minorities and women may
often be deterred from taking advantage of their right to equal access to formerly
all-white or all-male positions because doing so would mean forfeiture of previously
accrued seniorit y. 14
This potential for seniority systems to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination
creates a direct conflict between the expectations and rights of minorities' to equal access
to jobs and employment. benefits, and the expectations of non-minority employees created
by the continued operation of seniority systems. On the one hand, a successful Title VII
challenge to the operation of a seniority system could seriously diminish the seniority
system based rights and expectations of non-minority employees. On the other hand
denying minorities such a cause of act km would seriously impede Title V1I's goal of
removing all discriminatory barriers to equal employment opportunities. The central
issue posed by section 703(h) is therefore the extent to which the provision limits Title
entiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount (Atilt: wages or compensation
paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
" Id, See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HAM'. L. Rev. 1532, 1534-42 (1962).
'" See Cooper and Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1604-05 (1969).
" See generally Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23
RtrtGERs L. Rev. 268, 278-80 (1969); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. Pax, 1598, 1602-04
(1969); Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 177, 195
(1975).
12 Comment, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Layoff's, and Title Vii: Questions of Liability and Remedy,
CoLum. J. L. & Soc. PRofis. 343, 343-46 (1975).
13 Cooper & Sohol, supra note 10 at 1602.
Blumrosen, supra note 11, at 276-77. Seniority may be measured by a wide variety of means,
including total length of employment with the employer, referred to as employment, mill, or plant
seniority, length of service in a department, length of service in a line of progression, or length of
service in a particular job. Cooper and Sobel, supra note 11 at 1602.
I5 Title VII prohibits employment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.* 2000e-2 (1976) quoted .1?IpTa at note 4. For purposes of
brevity, this casenote will use the admittedly imprecise shorthand a "rninoritics" to refer to those
groups of persons protected under Title VII.
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VI Fs broad mandate against discriminatory employment practices in order to protect the
interests and expectations of non-minority employees. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly tried to balance these competing considerations in the context of interpreting
section 703(11), nurst recently in American Tobacco Company v. Patterson."'
Griggs v. Duke Power Compwq,' 7 the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits
employment practices which perpetuate or freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.'" The Court announced in Griggs that a prima facie violation of
Title VII may be established by demonstrating that an employment practice which is
neutral on its face and intent has a discriminatory impact on minorities.'" Thus, absent.
section 703(h), seniority systems that perpetuate prior discrimination would clearly be
prima facie violative of Title VII under Griggs, even without any affirmative showing of
intentional discrimination. The first courts to construe section 703(h) held that that
provision does 'tot preclude applicatiotiof the Griggs standard to seniority systems, stating
that seniority systems which perpetuate prior discrimination are not "bona fide - within
the meaning of section 703(h). 2 ° This analysis, however, was rejected by the Supreme
Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United Siates 2 ' which held t.hat under
section 703(h), discriminatory intent must be proved to invalidate an otherwise neutral
bona fide seniority system, and that discriminatory impact of a seniority system alone is
insufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII 22 Thus, prior to Patterson it had
been established that section 703(h) was intended to favor the interests of non-minority
employees under seniority systems over those of minority employees except in those
instances when intentional discrimination could be demonstrated. Nevertheless, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. subsequently interpreted Teamsters
to be limited to those seniority systems adopted prim - to the enactment of Title VII and
held that the Griggs analysis would continue to he available to minorities challenging a
post-Act seniority system. 23 In Patterson, therefore, the Supreme Court was presented
with another opportunity to consider the appropriate balance between the interests of
minority and non-minority employees intended in section 703(h).
I n 1969, John Patterson and other employees of the .American Tobacco Company
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that a
seniority system adopted in 1968, subsequent to the effective date of Title VII, violated
the Act. 21
 Until 1963, both the American Tobacco Company and the union representing
the hourly-paid production workers engaged in overt racial discrimination. 25
 The union
maintained segregated locals and black employees were assigned to lower paying and less
desirable positions than whites. 2 " Black employees of American Tobacco Company
claimed that the effects of ibis prior discrimination were perpetuated by a seniority
"' 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
'" Id. at 429 - 30.
" Id. at 430-32.
2 " See, e.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, litc„ 297 F. Stipp, 505, 518 (E.D. Va. 1968): see also cases
discussed infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" Id. at 349, 353-54.
23
 Patterson v. American Tobacco Company, 634 F.2d 744, 749 (4th Cir. 1980).
24
 456 U.S. at 66. The effective date of Title VII was July 2, 1965. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub, L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat, 241, 266 (1964).
" 456 U.S. at 65.
25 id.
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system that adopted nine lines of progression as the heirarchy for promotions." Each line
of progression consisted of two related jobs: an employee was not eligible for a top
position without first holding a bottom position." Four of the lines of progression
consisted of virtually all-white top positions in the more lucrative. fabrication department
paired with all-white bottom jobs in that department while two of the lines of progression
paired all-black top jobs with all-black bottom positions in the prefabrication depart-
ment. 29
The American Tobacco Company argued that the seniority system in question was
fully insulated from a Title VII challenge by section 703(h)." () Patterson contended that
section 703(h) had no applicability to the seniority system in dispute because that section
was only intended to protect those seniority systems adopted prior to the effective date of
Title V11. 3 ' The Suprenie Court held that section 703(h) does not distinguish either on its
face or in intent, between those seniority systems adopted prior to the effective date of
Title VII and those adopted after Title VII's effective date. 32 Instead, the Court held
that under section 703(h), a challenge to both pre- and post-Act seniority systems must be
accompanied by proof of discriminatory intent. 3
The significance of American Tobacco Company v. Patterson lies in the expansive answer
it provides to the question of how extensively section 703(h) narrows the broad reach of
Title VII. In the post -Patterson era, Tit le VIPs protection may only be invoked in seniority
system cases by those few minority employees who can demonstrate intentional discrimi-
nation. Because this burden is an extremely difficult one, 114 Patterson effectively limits Tide
VII as a tool for eliminating both forms of employment discrimination and the vestiges of
prior discrimination.
This casenote will review the legislative history of section 703(h) and the judicial
interpretation of that section prior to Patterson." Next, the reasoning of the Court and
that of the two dissenting opinions will be described." The Court's decision that section
703(h) applies to both pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems will then be analyzed, as will
be the alternative intepretations advocated in the two dissents." It will be maintained that
the Court's decision is inconsistent with the policy behind Title V I as well as the limited
interests sought to be protected by the seniority system exemption. 3 " It will be submitted
that in its emphasis on the plain language of section 703(h), the Court failed to adequately
examine the issues raised by this section." Furthermore, it will also be contended that the
Court's reliance on national labor policy favoring minimal interference with the collective
bargaining process is misplaced. 4(' Finally, it will be concluded that a distinction between
post-Act and pre-Act seniority systems for the purposes of section 703(h) can be based on
" Id. at 66.
28 Id.
29 Id.
" Id. at 67-68.
3 ' Id. at 68.
32 Id. at 69, 71-75.
33 Id. at 75-76.
3' See Pullman Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277 (1982) (establishing discriminatory
intent requires proof of actual motive): see also infra note 236.
35 See infra notes 42-128 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 157-210 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 221 -92 and accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 241 - 63 and accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 221-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
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the language of that section which states that a seniority system must be "bona fide" as well
as not intentionally discriminatory in order to be immunized from Title VII, and that
such an interpretation would serve to protect the interests intended protection while
furthering the broad policy objectives of the Act.'
I_ BACKGROUND OF SECTION 703(h)
In order to fully understand the significance of Patterson as well as to assess ade-
quately the reasoning of the Court, it is necessary to view Patterson in the context of the
Court's prior interpretations of section 703(h) and the legislative history of this provision.
The following section, therefore, will briefly review I he legislative history of section 703(h)
and the Court's past treatment of the issues raised by 703(h),
A. Legislative History of Section 703(h)
The original version of Title VII reported out of the House judiciary Committee"
and passed by the House did not contain section 703(h).'0 Neither the House Bill, nor the
Majority Judiciary Committee Report mentioned the problem of sebiority." The Minor-
ity Judiciary Committee Report, however, alleged that Title VII would "grant the power
to destroy union seniority. . . the extent of actions which would he taken to destroy the
seniority system is unknown and unknowable." 4i 7Representative Dowdy, a signatory of
the Minority Report, repeated this interpretation of Title VII on the House floor" and
introduced an amendment. exempting all hiring and employment practices governed by a
seniority system from Title VII coverage.'" This amendment was defeated without
debate,"
The House bill was sent directly to the Senate floor, without first being.referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee." The issue of will, wily was raised iu the Senate debates on
the bill when opponents of Title VII claimed that the Act would destroy existing seniority
rights and reverse the progress that organized labor had achieved." This debate
prompted Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan floor managers of the Senate
Bill, to introduce into the Congressional Record interpretive memoranda emphasizing that
Title VII would have no retroactive effect on established seniority rights.'` Senators Clark
" See infra notes 293-303 and accompanying text.
42
 H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Scss. (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Com: Cos:G. & AD.
NEWS 2391.
43
 H.R. 7152, passed by the House of Representatives, at 110 Cong. Rec. 2804, 88th Cong., 2c1
Sess. (1964).
•	 " H.R. Rep. No. 914, supra, note 42.
45 Id., 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2440 (Minority Report).
46
 110 Cong. Rec. 2726 (1964).
" Id. at 2727. The text of the amendment provided:
The provisions of this title shall not be applicable to any employer whose hiring and
employment practices are pursuant to (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system; (3) a
system which predicates its practice upon ability to produce either in quantity or




 Id. at. 2738.
4" See Vaas, Tide VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Cost L. REV. 431, 443-44 (1966).
5" See 110 CONG. Rr.c. 486 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill). Senator Hill alleged that "benefits
which organized labor had attained through the years would no longer be matters of right... ."Id.
" Id. at 7207. The relevant passage of the (.1:irk-Case Interpretive Memorandum is as follows:
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and Case also introduced a Justice Department statement that "Tide VII would have no
effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.'
It. was no't until several weeks after these debates that Senate majority leader Mans-
field and Senate minority leader Dirksen introduced a substitute bill containing section
703(h).' 3 Section 703(h) was apparently drafted with the intent of negating the earlier
criticism that Title VII might destroy existing seniority rights.'" There were no further
debates in the issue. Senators Dirksen and Humphrey did, however, express the view that
section 703(h) was not intended to alter t he scope of Title VII, but rather "merely clarified
its present intent and effect.-55 This compromise bill containing section 703(h) was
enacted as Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 without a committee report and the
usual accompanying legislative materials.''` Despite the absence of these materials, the
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the
employer's obligation Would be simply to fill future vacancies on a In mclisaimilratory
basis. He would not be obliged — or indeed, permitted — to fire whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give
them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. (How-
ever, where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the effective date of
the title, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after the title takes
effect may he held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish discrimination.)
Id. at 7213. Senators Clark and Case also introduced a series of questions and answers about Title
VII, the relevant portion of which provides:
Question... • Normally, labor contracts call for last hired, first fired." If the last hired
are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired
and the remaining employees are white?
Answer.... Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last hired, first
fired- agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still be "first fired" as
long as it is done because of his status of "last hired" and not because of his race.
Question. . . If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because of
discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer.... The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change
existing seniority lists.
Id. at 7217.
5! Id. at 7207. The pertinent portion of the Justice Department Memorandum provides:
First, it has been asserted that title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority. This
is not correct, Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it
takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be
affected in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to
discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority
than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance
for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem
pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the
seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under title V II. [fa rule were
to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any white man, such a rule could not
serve as the basis for a discharge subsequent 10 the effective date of the title. I do not
know how anyone could quarrel with such a result.
Id.
" Id. at 11,926: see V ilati, supra note 49, at 445
- 46.
54 See Teamsters. 431 U.S. at 352.
" 110 Cove. Rec. 12,723 (1964).
56 See Vaas, supra n ote 49, at 443-44, 457-58.
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legislative history that is extant strongly suggests t hat section 703(h) was not intended as a
substantial limitation on the scope of Title VII, but rather was only intended to protect
the seniority based expectations of non-minorities that had arisen prior to the passage of
Title VII.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 703(h) Prior to Patterson
The seminal case construing section 703(h) is Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc." The
defendant company in Quarles had maintained a formally segregated hierarchy of job
positions until six months after the effective date of Title Because of this past
hiring discrimination, black employees were concentrated in the lowest paying depart-
nictus.'"" The collective bargaining agreement in operation at the defendants plant
provided for a departmental seniority system." Consequently black employees could
only transfer to the more desirable position in the previously all white departments by
hirleiting all the seniority they had accrued in their former departments.'" The plaintiffs
alleged that the departmental seniority system acted to deter interdepartmental transfers
by blacks and thus perpetuated the effects of t heir employer's prior discrimination. 62
The district court rejected the defendant's argument that the seniority system was
protected by section 703(h), holding that a departmental seniority system that had its
genesis in racial discrimination and perpetuated t he effects of the prior discrimination,
was not bona fide and therefore not entitled to the protection of section 703(h)." After
reviewing the legislative history of section 703(11), the Quarles court. stated that Congress
did not specifically address the validity of departmental seniority systems, but was con-
cerned with employment seniority systems only."' The court concluded that the intent of
section 703(h) was to ensure that the Act would not require preferential treatment of
minorities over incumbant white employees with accrued employment seniority. fi5
 The
court further stated that the legislative history of section 703(h) also demonstrated that
"Congress did riot intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discrim-
inatory patterns that existed before the act..."
The position of the Quarles court has received considerable support in the Circuit
Courts of Appeal," 7 while the contrary position, that merely prolonging the effects of
" 279 F. Stipp. 505 (E,U. Va. 1968).
58
 Id. at 508.
" Id, at 511.
" hl.
" Id. at 513-14.
In
 Id. at 514.
" Id. at 5 17. The court stated that:
Section 703(h) expressly states the seniority system must be bona fide. The purpose of
the act is to eliminate racial discrimination in covered employment. Obviously one
characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of discrimination. Nothing in
§ 703(h), or in its legislative history. suggests that a racially discriminatory seniority
system established before the act is a bona fide seniority system under the act.
Id.
" Id. at 516.
" Id.
" Id.
" The Quarles holding was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Local 189, United Paper Makers &
Paper Workers, the first appellate decision addressing the validity under Title VII of departmental
seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Local 189, United Paper Nlakers
& Paper Workers, 416 F.2t1 980, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The Fourth,
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prior discrimination is not enough to take a plan outside the orbit of section 703(h),
received comparatively little support." Congress also indicated its approval of the Quarles
approach in 1972 when it amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the enactment of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972." The reports of both t he Senate
Committee on Labor and Public NiVellarc''' and the House Committee on Eclucation and
Laborn cited Quarles with apparent approval."
The first case addressing the scope of' section 703(h) to reach the Supreme Court was
Franks a. Bowman TransPorlation Corp." Franks did not involve a direct challenge to the
operation of a seniority system, but rather raised the issue of whether or not retroactive
seniority was a proper remedy for victims of post-Act discriminatory hiring and promo-
tion practices:74 The Franks Court, however was not faced with defining the substantive
scope of section 703(h), as the Court was in Patterson.'" Nonetheless, the Court was
presented with the same fundamental questions underlying section 703(h); do the goals
of Title VII and the interests of victims of discrimination justify diminishing the seniority
rights and expectations of third party employees? 76
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits subsequently adopted the Quarles. and Local 189 view that seniority
systems which perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination are not afforded immunity from Title
VII by section 703(h). See, eq., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257_266 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1977); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977): United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 1318,
1325-26 (9th Cir. 1975); United Slates v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 1973).
Similarly, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have also indicated their approval of Quarles and Local 189.
See, e.g., Howe a. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 11.2d 896, 900-902 (7th Cir. 1973);Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. dented, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
" See, Dobbins v. Local 212, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443
(S.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. N.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
" Pub. L. No. 92
- 261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 Supp. I V
1980)).
7" S. REP. No. 415, 92t1 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
1 ' H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
72 S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 n.1 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 8
n.2 (1971). The committee reports also indicate recognition that the problem of employment
discrimination was far more complex than originally thought in 1964, particularly that of neutral
practices which discriminate in operation. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); H.R. REF.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). For example, the Senate Report stated:
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in
terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature
on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the ntechanics of seniority and
lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory prac-
tices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements. In
short, the problem is one whose resolution in many instances requires not only expert
assistance, but also the technical perception that the problem exists in the first instance
and that the system complained of is unlawful.
S. Pm.. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), It is also significant to note that an analysis of the 1972
amendments prepared by the Conference Committee stated that unless otherwise indicated, existing
Title VII case law would continue to govern the application and construction of Title 'V11. 118 CONG.
REC. 7166, 7563-64 (1972). No such contrary indication regarding the proper construction of section
703(h) can be found in the 1972 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
73 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
" Id. at 750.
75 See infra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
76 See 424 U.S. at 773-79. While the majority answered this question affirmatively. Chief Justice
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The Court held that section 703(h) does not restrict or modify the relief otherwise
appropriate under Title VII," but rather delineates which employment practices are
illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not.'" The Court noted that the petitioners
were not challenging the operation of a seniority system as violative of Title VII, but
instead were challenging the use of a discriminatory hiring system and were seeking the
seniority status they would have attained bin for the discriminatory hiring policies. 7 "
After determining that section 703(h) was inapplicable to questions of relief available
under Title VII, the Court held that victims of 'post-Act hiring discrimination would be
presumptively entitled to an award of retroactive seniority." The Court pointed to the
ever-increasing role of' seniority in allocating employment benefits and viewed retroactive
seniority as crucial to fulfilling the "make whole" purposes of the Act." The Court.
rejected the argument that to award retroactive seniority to victims of hiring discrimina-
tion would unfairly infringe on the expectations of "arguably innocent employees, -"
stating that "a sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is presumptively necessary
(and) is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of equity . jurisdiction .. .."83 Thus,
by granting retroactive seniority to victims of discrimination, the Court. effectively recog-
nized t hat. when faced with the difficult task of determining whether the interests of a
protected class under Title VII or those of innocent. third parties shall prevail, the goals
of Title VII tip the balance in favor of t he victims of unlawful discrimination.
The Court was again faced with this issue in Internalnmal Brotherhood of Teamsters a.
tinned Slates," the next seniority case to reach the Supreme Court. Unlike Franks,
Teamsters involved a direct challenge to the operation of a seniority system" and thus
section 703(h) was considered to be directly applicable." The seniority system in question
allocated benefits, such as vacations, eligibility for pension plans, and other fringe benefits
on the basis of an employee's total length of set -vice within the company." "Competitive
Seniority," which determined order of layoff and recall and preference in bidding for
promotions, however, was calculated according to an employee 's length of service within a
particular bargaining unit." Due to intentional pre-Act discrimination, minorities had
been confined to the less desirable and lower paying positions." Although minorities
could now transfer to more favorable positions, they could only do so at the cost of
Burger and justice Powell, joined by justice Rehnquist, both dissented from the ► ajority's holding
that victims of post-Act discrimination are presumptively entitled to a grant of retroactive seniority.
Sir id. at 780-99. Chief justice Burger stated that such a grant would inequitably infringe on the
rights of innocent employees and advocated a monetary award in lieu of retroactive seniority. Id. at
780-81, Justice Powell contended that while § 703(h) is not directly applicable, this provision did
represent Congressional concern with the rights of third parties. Id. at 791-92. The trial court sitting
in equity, he continued, should therefore balance the interests of discriminatees and those of third
parties in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Id. at 794.
" Id. at 762.
78 Id. at 761.
7" hi. at 758.
'" Id. at 779 & n.41,
• hi. at 766.
" 2 Id, at 773-74.
83
 hi. at 777.
" 931 U.S. 324 (1977).
• hi. at 329-30.
• hi, at 348-54.
" 7
 hi. at 343.
8" hi. at 343-44.
8" See id. at 344-45.
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forfeiting all the competitive seniority they had accrued in their prior bargaining unit and
therehtre risk losing their jobs entirely in the event of layoffs."
The Court maintained that the clear import of section 703(h) was to protect the
settled expectations of employees under seniority systems adopted prior to the effective
date of Title VII."' That is, no successful challenge could be made unless the seniority
system could be shown to he discriminatory in intent and not merely in effect."' In so
holding, the Supreme Conti rejected the reasoning that a neutral seniority system which
perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination could not be "bona fide" within the
meaning of section 703(h), and thus could not be afforded the protection of that section."
The Court stated that section 703(h) precludes the application of the Griggs disparate
impact test to seniority systems challenged under Title VII. 94
As a Vigorous dissent written by Justice Marshall p(linted out.,"' the majority's opinion
in Teamsters marked a drastic change in Title VII jurisprudence."' The Teamsters Court
overruled a decade of lower court decisions"' and rulings of the bittal Employment
Opportunity Comrnission" 8 holding that seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of
prior discrimination are not "bona fide" and therefore do not come under the protection
of the section 703(h) exemption."
Justice Marshall contended that the Congressional intent. behind section 703(h) was
only to protect the seniority rights of nonminority employees from dilution by either
grants of superseniority to members of minority groups based solely on their status as
minority members or invalidation of a seniority system solely because °fa disparate impact.
on newly hired minorities.'" Justice Marshall was particularly concerned that the
Teamsters holding would be applied to seniority systems that perpetuate post-Act as well as
pre-Act discrimination.'"' Relying on language in the legislative history of section 703(h)
referring to "established seniority rights,"" 2 justice Marshall maintained that the thrust
of section 703(h) was to protect. only those expectations arising prior to the adoption of
Title VII and not all expectations based on seniority systems with a discriminatory
impact . 1 " 3
In United Air Lines v. Evaus,' "4 a case decided the same clay as Teamsters, the Court also
rejected a challenge to a seniority system based on the system's perpetuation of the effects
90 Id.
9 ' Id. at 352-54.
92 Id,
" 3 id, at 355-56.
"' Id. at 349-50. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court held that a
plaintiff in a Title VII case need not prove intent. Id. at 432. Rather, a Title VII plaintiff may
establish a prima . facie case of unlawful discrimination by demonstrating that an employment practice
adversely has a disparate negative impact on minorities or women. Id. at 430-31.
95 431 U.S. at 377.
9" Id. at 378-80.
" Id. at 378-79. See cases cited id. at 378 n.2.
"" Id. at 379-80. See cases cited id. at 380 n.4. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1"" Id. at '378.
'"" Id. at 385.
'°' Id. at 383.
'" id. at 385. Justice Marshall cited the Clark-Case Interpretative Memorandum as well as the
Justice Department memorandum ("seniority rights existing at the time (Title V11) takes effect. -) and
the series of questions and answers prepared by Senators Clark and Case stating that Title VII is not
retroactive. Id. For the text of these and the questions and answers, see supra notes 51-52.
1 " 431 U.S. at 384-85.
104 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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of a post-Act. discriminatory employment practice. The respondent in Evans, a female
flight attendant, was forced to resign when she married in 1968." 5 In a separate action in
which Evans was not a party, United's policy of prohibiting female flight attendants from
being married was struck clown as violative of Title VII."' In 1972, Evans was rehired.
but she was denied the seniority she had previously accrued as a United employee.'"
Evans sued for seniority retroactive to the date of her forced resignation, claiming that the
seniority system gave present effect to the earlier discrimination since she had less
seniority than she would have had but for the discriminatory discharge.'"
The Court held that she was not entitled to the relief requested.'" The majority
ruled that the employer was entitled to treat. the discriminatory discharge as equivalent to
pre-Act discrimination since it was not the subject of a timely charge to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.'" The Court stated that both male and female
employees who had been terminated for discriminatory or nondiscriminatory reasons
and had subsequently been rehired were denied previously accrued seniority.'" The
Court thus found that Evans' complaint failed to allege that the seniority system treated
similarly situated males and females differently. 12 In a footnote, Justice Stevens noted
that the, instant case did not present the issue raised by the Quarles line of cases because
Evans did not allege that a departmental seniority system deterred her Ihnn exercising
any rights granted by Title VII."' Emphasizing that the seniority system was neutral in
operatitttt, the Court held that sect ion 703(h) precItides a plaintiff from basing a challenge
to a neutral seniority system on the mere fact that the seniority system perpetuates the
effects of a prior discriminatory act which has no current legal significance.'" To reach a
contrary holding, the Court concluded, would allow claims for seniority in time-barred
discrimination claims, frustrating the intent of section 703(h). 11''
While Teamsters set forth the proposition that established seniority systems which
perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination would be immunized by section 703(h) if
bona fide and neutral in intent, and Evans similarly established that section 703(h)
precludes an attack on a neutral seniority system despite that. system's ef fect of perpetual-
al 554.
106
107 hi. at 555.
108 Id. at 557.
"" Id. at 560.
1 ' 0
 M. at 55K,
'" Id. at 557.
i n M. at 558.
"3 Id, at 558, n.10.
'" Id. at 560. The Court noted that Evans had not alleged that the seniority system,was either
not bona fide or intentionally discriminatory, and that:
The statute does not foreclose attacks on the current operation of seniority systems
which are subject to challenge as discriminatory. But such a challenge to a neutral
system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which has no present
legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit, even if the past. event
might at one time have justified a valid claim against the employer.
Id. This language, as well as the statement that she system in question was not discriminatory in
operation, scented to leave open the possibility that a seniority system which perpetuates post-Act
discrimination may be challenged on the basis of its disparate impact on women or minorities. Such a
reading of Evans, however, was foreclosed by the Court in Patterson. which interpreted Evans and
Teamsters to hold that section 703(h) precludes the application of a disparate impact analysis to all
seniority systems, despite the systems' effect of perpetuating either pre- or post-Act discrimination.
Patterson, 456 U.S. at 75-76.
"" 431 U.S. at 560.
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ing a prior discriminatory act, these cases left open the question of what employment.
practices would be considered to he part. of a seniority system and thus accorded the
protection of that provision. In 1980, however, the Supreme Court addressed this issue
in part in California Brewers Association v. Brranl."" The issue presented to the Court in
Bryan/ was whether a provision in a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement
providing that an employee must work forty-five weeks within a single calendar year
before attaining the status of a permanent. employee was part of a seniority system and
thus entitled to 703(h) immunity."' Permanent employees enjoyed greater rights with
respect to protection from layoff, preference in recall, and inter-plant bumping privi-
leges, than did temporary employees.'" The California brewing industry, however, is
seasonal. Consequently, an employee could work in the industry fOr several years and
never attain permanent status.'" Black brewery workers brought Title VII charges
alleging that this provision had a disproportionately adverse impact on blacks, none of
whom had ever attained the status of a permanent employee.'"
The Court held that the "forty-five week" provision of the collective bargaining
agreement at issue was a part of a seniority system, within the meaning of section
703(h). 12 ' After noting diat neither Title VII nor the legislative history of that Act defines
seniority sysiems.122
 the Court relied on "commonly accepted notions about 'seniority' in
industrial relations,"' 23 to define a seniority system for the purposes of section 703(h) as
"a scheme that, alone or in tandem with non 'seniority' criteria, allots to employees ever
improving employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employ-
ment increase."'"
Applying this definition of seniority systems for the purposes of section 703(h), the
Court stated that the forty-five week rule served the necessary function of establishing
eligibility for entrance into the permanent employee seniority track' and thus was a
component of the seniority system entitled to the protection of section 703(h). 12 " The
Court. noted, however, that on remand, the plaintiff in Biyant still could prevail if he
could prove that the forty-five week rule was not "bona fide," or that the differences in
employment engendered by the rule were the result of intentional racial discrimina-
I ion. ' 27
Bryant, by interpreting the term "seniority system" for purposes of section 703(h) to
16
 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
"7 Id. at 600-01.
"" See id. at 603 -04.
" 9 Id. at 615 (Marshall, J.. dissenting).
"0 Id. at 602.
1 " Id. at 610.
122
 Id. at 605.
123 Id .
124 Id. at 605-06. The Court noted that for a seniority system to function, it must contain rules
that are not related to length of employment, such as rules determining when seniority will begin to
accrue, how seniority may be forfeited, and what periods of employment will count towards an
employee's accrued seniority. Id. at 607. The Court further supported its liberal definition of
"seniority systems- for the purposes of section 703(11) by stating that Congress enacted t he Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against the historical context of a long tradition of freedom of collective
bargaining and did not intend to prekr any one particular type of seniority system. Id. at 608.
25
 id, at 609.
126 Id. at 610.
' 2 ' Id. at 610-11.
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include "loin-seniority criteria . ' related to the operation of a seniority system)"- 8
broadened (lie class of employment practices that would he protected by section 703(11), as
interpreted by the Court its Teamsters and Evans. Teamsters and Evans had also afforded a
broad construction to the scope of the immunity from Title VII provided by section
703(h) by holding that section to immunize those seniority systems that perpetuate the
effects of pre-Act discrimination unless intentionally discriminatory as well is those
neutral systems that perpetuate the effects of post-Act discrimination. It is against this
background of the Court's broad interpretation of section 703(h) that the black employees
of the American Tobacco Company sought to limit Teamsters to pre-Act seniority systems
and thus attain relief in Title VII from a post-Act seniority system that adversely
affected minority employees.
i 1. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY t'. PATTERSON
The seniority system challenged in Patterson allegedly violated Title VII because,
although adopted subsequent to the Act, the plan penalized minority workers for leaving
job patterns which were t he result of prior discrimination.'" The American Tobacco
Company operated two manufacturing plants, each composed of a prefabrication and a
fabrication department.'" The Bakery, Confectionary, & Tobacco Workers' Interna-
tional Union and its local affiliate were the exclusive collective bargaining representatives
of the hourly-paid production workers at both of these plants.' 31
 Prior to 1963, both the
employer and the Union engaged in overt racial discrimination.'" The Union main-
tained segregated locals and the employer assigned blacks to the prefabrication depart-
ment, largely excluding them from the more desirable and more lucrative positions in the
fabrication department.'" An employee could only transfer departments by forfeiting all
his accrued seniority)" In 1963, pressure from the federal government resulted in
modifications of these practices."' The Union merged its previously segregated locals
and a plantwide seniority system replaced the departmental seniority system. 13i' Promo-
tions were based on seniority plus other qualifications, and inter-plant transfers resulted
in a loss of accrued seniority.'" During this time, only white workers secured promotions
to the fabrication departments from the prefabrication departments and thus t he Amer-
ican Tobacco Company's plants remained racially stratified. 138
The seniority and promotions system again underwent revision in 1968. 1 " The
company proposed, and the union ratified, a promotions and seniority system based on
nine lines of progression,"" Each tine of progression generally consisted of two related
jobs."' An employee was not eligible for the top job in a line of progression instil he
1 " Id. at 606.
"9
 Patterson, 456 U.S. at 66-67.


















worked the bottom job in the line.'" Six of the liMe lines of progression were at issue in
Patterson. 14 a Four of the lines of progression consisted of virtually all white top jobs in the
fabrication department paired with nearly all white hot t o t jobs in the same department,
while two of the lines of progression consisted of all black top jobs in the prefabrication
department. linked with all black bottom prefabrication jobs.' 44 The most lucrative posi-
tions in the American Tobacco Company's two plants were the top jobs in the white lines
of progression.' ' 3
In early I 969, John Patterson and two other black employees filed charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the American Tobacco Corn-
pony and the Tobacco Workers' International Union had engaged in racially discrimina-
tory employment practices."' After conciliation efforts failed, the black workers filed suit
under Title VII . 1 '" The district court found that the defendants' seniority, promotion,
and job classification policies were violative of Title VII.' 4 ' The court enjoined further
use of six of the nine lines of progression on t he grounds t that they perpetuated the effects
of prior discrimination and were not justified by business necessity. 14 ' The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's findings and remanded for• further proceedings on the issue of
remedy. 15" The Supreme Court denied certiorari."'
Following the district courts entry of a revised judgment in accordance with the
circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court decided Teamsters and Evans, The Company
moved for relief from judgment asserting inter alio, that section 703(h), as interpreted by
Teamsters, insulates bona fide seniority systems from .Tide VII attack in the absence of a
showing of discriminatory intent."' The district court denied the motion, holding that
the seniority system in question was not bona fiche since it -operated right up to the day of
trial in a discriminatory manner. - ' 53 A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that Teamsters required no relief from judgment, since the lines of progression
were not part of a seniority system within the meaning of section 703(11). 134 The Fourth
Circuit then reheard the case en banc. 1 ''' It did not determine whether the lines of
progression were part of a seniority system, but rather held that assuming the lines of
progression were part of a seniority system, they would not he protected by section 703(h)
because Congress intended for that exemption to apply only to seniority systems adopted
prior to the effective date of Title VII and to the post-Act application of t hose systems.""
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, vacated the judgment below and









'" Irf. The district court's decision is unreported,
148 Id.
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
15' American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
132 Patterson, 456 U.S. at 67. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349,353-54; see also supra notes 84-94 and
accompanying text.
123 456 U.S. at 67. The district court's decision was unreported.
' 34 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978).
"5 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980).
'' Id. at 748-49.
"7 456 U.S. at 77.
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written by Justice White, rejected the argument advanced by the employees and adopted
by the Fourth Circuit, that the section 703(h) exemption only extends to pre-Act seniority
systems.'''" The Court also rejected the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that section 703(h), by its terms, applies only to challenges to the application,
and not the adoption, of a post-Act seniority system and thus does not preclude a
challenge to t he adoption of a seniority system I hat will have discriminatory consequences
once applied, if that challenge is filed within 180 days of the adoption of the system.""
The Court held t hat section 703(h) exempts hot h pre and post-Act seniority systems front
Title VI I's scrutiny in the absence of discriminatory intent.'" Justice Brennan's dissent,
joined by justices Blackmun and Marshall, supported the position of the EEOC. 16 ' Justice
Stevens, dissenting separately, argued that the seniority system in question was not bona
fide within the meaning of section 703(h) since it was violative at the time of adoption due
to the system's adverse impact on a protected class.'"
The majority opinion was primarily based on the Court's reading of the language
employed in section 703(11).'" The Court emphasized that on its face. section 703(h)
makes no distinction between pre and post-Act seniority systems."' The Court supported
its strong reliance on the plain language of the statute by noting that the drafters of the
Dirksen-Mansfield compromise bill, of which section 703(h) was a part, had spent
"months of labor,"''' on this bill, attempting "to be mindful of every word, of every
comma, and of the shading of every phrase,'" In addition, the Court noted that
Congress had employed the use of an unambiguous grandfather's clause elsewhere in
Title VI I.'" Therefore, reasoned the Court, if section 703(h) was intended as a grand-
father or savings clause, the wording of this section would have reflected this intent in
clear language.'"
The Court next addressed the position of the EEOC and Justice Brennan, similarly
based, in part, on the plain language of section 703(h), advocating recognition of the
distinction between adoption and application of a seniority system and concluded it to be
untenable.'" The Court noted that although section 703(h) does state that an employer
'' 	 Id. at 76.
159 Id. at 69-71; contra id. at 77-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Section 706(e) of the Act requires
aggrieved parties to file a complaint with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
456 U.S. at 76.
'K 1 Id. at 77-86.
' 02 Id. at 86-90.
"3 See id. at 68-69.
1 " Id. at 69.
' 65 Id. at 68, quoting 110 COSG. REC. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
"" 456 U.S. at 69.
"7 Id. The Court pointed to 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-(b) (1976) as an example of such a clause. 456
U.S. at 69. That provision as amended by Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972), defines an
employer within the meaning of Title VII as a -person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees . . except that during the first years after March 24, 1972
persons having fewer than 25 employees . . . shall not be considered employers." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-(b) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). As originally enacted, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) defined employ-
ers as those persons employing twenty-live or more employees except that during the first year after
the effective date of the Act, persons having fewer than one hundred employees were not to he
considered employers within the meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1964).
"" 456 U.S. at 69.
169 Id.
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may "apply - different terms of employment pursuant to a seniority system, no limit is
placed on the date of adoption of such systems."* The Court also found the distinction
between adoption and application of a seniority system to he logically unsupportable. 171
The mere adoption of a seniority system could not give rise to a cause of action under
Title VII because no discriminatory impact would result until the system was applied.'"
The Court reasoned further that the EEOC's interpretation would create the situation of
favoring those workers employed when a seniority system is adopted over later-hired
employees, since presumably, only the former would normally be able to meet Title VIls
180 clay filing requirement.'" Finally, in rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of section
703(h), the Court stated that employers and unions would be discouraged from modify-
ing pre-Act seniority systems since even if such modifications benefitted minorities, they
would be subject to attack under the Griggs disparate impact standard. 174
After concluding that the plain language of section 703(h) was dispositive of t he issue
at bar, the Court proceeded to examine the legislative history of the section in response to
the Fourth Circuit's finding t hat the intent of the drafters of section 703(h) was to protect
only seniority systems adopted prior to the effective date of Title VII,' The Court
rejected this reading of the legislative history, noting that it was inconclusive at best. 176
The Court pointed to statements in the legislative history stressing that Title VII would
have no effect on seniority at all, as demonstrating a distinct lack of intent to distinguish
between pre and post-Act seniority systems.'" Those statements in the legislative history
referring to "established,'"" or "existing, - ' 7 " seniority rights were made in response to
specific allegations that Title VII would destroy established seniority rights and thus could
not be considered to evidence an intent to limit section 703(h)'s coverage to pre-Act
seniority systems. 18 "
The Court found further support for its construction of section 703(h) in its prior
decisions. 18 ' Recognition of a distinction in section 703(h) between pre and post-Act
seniority systems, the Court stated, would be inconsistent with its holdings in Teamsters
and Evans.'" The Court observed t hat Teamsters had construed section 703(h) to insulate
seniority systems from a disparate impact analysis, even if the disparate effect of the
operation of a seniority system flows from racially discriminatory pre-Act employment
practices. 1 R 3 Similarly, the Court noted that by ruling in Evans that a discriminatory act
not challenged in a timely manner is the legal equivalent of a pre-Act practice, section
vTo
"I Id.
"2 Id. at 69-70.
' 73 Id. at 70.
174 Id. at 71.
1 " Id. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 (4th Cir. 1980).
176
 456 U.S. at 71.
177 Id. at 72-74.
178 110 Coac. REC. 7213 (1964) (Clark-Case Interpretative Memorandum). See supra note 51 for
a discussion of the Clark-Case Memorandum.
1" 110 Coma. REC. 7207 (Justice Department Memorandum). See supra note 52 for a discussion
of the Justice Department Memorandum.
456 U.S. at 73-74.
' 81 Id. at 75-76.
182 Id.
"i Id. at 75. For a discussion of the Teamsters decision see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying
text.
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703(h) was also held to insulate seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of post-Act
discrimination.'"
In concluding, the Court stated that its decision was consistent with national labor
policy favoring minimal governmental interference with provisions of collective bargain-
ing agreements."' Title VII's exemption for bona fide seniority systems. the Court
stressed, represents the balance struck by Congress between the potentially conflicting
interests of pursuing a policy of eradicating employment discrimination and a policy of
freedom of collective bargaining-.""
Justice Brennan dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, contended
that by its terms, section 703(h) allows an employer to "apply- different conditions of
employment "pursuant to" a bona fide seniority system, but does not protect the adoption
of discriminatory seniority systems."' Even if the term "apply" were to be construed to
include adoption, .Justice Brennan reasoned, it would still remain inexplicable how a
decision to adopt a seniority system could be made "pursuant to" the same system.'"
justice Brennan also considered it significant that section 703(h) only refers to "employ-
ers" practices and not those of unions.'" Application of a seniority system is usually the
sole responsibility of the employer, whereas adoption of a seniority system generally
requires agreement by both the employer and the union.'" Therefige, concluded Justice
Brennan, if section 703(h) were meant to protect adoption of a seniority system, this
section would also refer to unions as well as employers."'
In addition to relying on the language of section 703(h). justice Brennan also argued
that his interpretation of the seniority system exemption was consistent with the intent of
that provision as expressed in the legislative history, 12 The purpose of section 703(h)
according to justice Brennan was to "protect the rwpecialions that employees acquire
through the continued operation of a seniority systetn," 1 J 3 and not to protect the vesting of
new rights under discriminatory seniority systems."'" A timely challenge to the adoption
of a seniority system with discriminatory effects would prevent employees from develop-
ing expectations of seniority right before the system was applied."'
ustice Brennan also contended that limiting the section 703(h) exemption to the
application of seniority systems would not, as the majority had claimed, lead to untenable
results.'" He asserted that the adoption of a seniority system would give rise to a cause of
action since a cause of action arises immediately upon the discriminatory act and need not
await the time when the consequences of the act are felt."' Finally,.lustice Brennan stated
that limiting the scope of section 703(h) to the application of seniority systems would not
discourage unions and employers from making beneficial modifications of seniority
"4 456 U.S. at 75. For a discussion of the Evans decision see supra notes 104-15 and accom-
panying text,
15 " 456 U.S. at 76-77.
'
x'' lar.
07 Id. :it 79 - 80.
"" Id. at 80.
[DO Id.
,I a
I"S N. at 80-84.
Id. at 81 (emphasis in the original).
I !Pi Id.
19s Id.
"" Id. at 84,




 This is true, according to Justice Brennan, because only the modified provi-
sions, not the entire seniority system, would be required to !fleet the disparate impact
standard.'" Those modifications favoring minorities who were the victims of previous
discrimination would be valid under the Court's decision in United Steel Workers of America
v. Weber.'" justice Brennan, therefore, would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding
invalidating the six lines of progression under the Griggs disparate impact standard, if' it
were determined on remand that the employees had filed a timely challenge to the
adoption of the seniority system in dispute.'"
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, would have affirmed the lower court on the
grounds that the seniority system did not fall under the protection of section 703(h)
because it was not bona fide."' Justice Stevens asserted that the majority misread section
703(h) as precluding a challenge to any seniority system that is, not intentionally discrim-
inatory by overlooking the requirement in section 703(h) that a seniority system must also
he "bona fide" to be afforded the protection of this exemption. 2 p 3
Justice Stevens defined a bona fide seniority system as one legal when adopted.'" Ile
then observed t hat Title VII prohibits employment practices that are "lair in form but
discriminatory in practice."L 1 ' Thus, under justice Stevens' view, a seniority system
adopted after the effective date of Title V11 that perpetuates prior discrimination, or has
an adverse impact on persons covered by the Act, is violative of Title VII at its inception
and therefore cannot be considered bona fide.'" The limitation in section 703(h) that a
seniority system must not be the result of an intent to discriminate, argued Justice
Stevens, was intended as denying the protection of section 703(h) to intentionally discrim-
inatory seniority systems, rather than as the sole standard by which to measure all
seniority systems."'
Justice Stevens considered the majority's "strained reading —2 " of section 703(h) to he
based on a fear of widespread invalidation of seniority systems.'" Such apprehension is
unfounded, he argued, because even if a seniority system was fOund to violate the Griggs
standard, the business necessity defense would be available to justify the use of a seniority
system with a disparate impact if it is substantially related to a valid business purpose. 2 c"
1 ' 8 456 U.S. at 85-86.
11111 Id.
2" 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action plan adopted by employer and union permissible
under Title VII although it discriminated against nonminorities).
2 ' 1 ' 456 U.S. at 86.
212
 /d. at 90.
210
 Id. at 87, 89,
204 Id. at 87-89.
2" Id. at 88 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).




2111 Id. at 89-90. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (1971). Under Griggs, an employment practice which
has a disparate impact on women or minorities does not violate Title VII if it can be demonstrated
that the employment practice in question bears a "manifest relationship to the' employment in
question," Id. at 432. According to the Griggs Court, "[Ole touchstone is business necessity." Id. at
431.
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III. A CRiTiquE. or /I Aft:ft/GAN Toimcco ComPANY V. PATTERSON
The Supreme Court in Griggs, relying on Title VIls objective to eliminate those
employment practices that serve as harriers to equal employment opportunities, even if
neutral in intent, as well as those employment practices that are intentionally discrimina-
tory, 2 " established that a Title VII claim need not be predicated on proof of discrimina-
tory intent. 2 ' 2 Rather, the Griggs Court held that a prima facie violation of Title VII can
he established by demonstrating that a neutral employment policy has a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on a protected class."' It has been clear since Teamsters, however,
that section 703(h) precludes the application of Griggs to seniority systems adopted prior
to t he passage of Title VII.'" The Patterson Court extended this grant of immunity to
systems adopted subsequent to Title VII as wel1. 2 ' 5 Thus, in contrast to the normal Title
VII ease in which a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination merely by
demonstrating that a particular employment practice has an adverse impact on a pro-
tected class, 216 a plaintiff challenging the operation of a seniority system may only succeed
upon proof of discriminatory intent. 217
 The Court reached t his holding by reading the
language of section 703(h) as providing no basis for distinguishing between pre and
post-Act seniority systems.'" Additional support was found in prior Supreme Court
decisions construing section 703(h) 21 " and in the observation that national labor policy
favors minimal governmental intrusion into the collective bargaining process.'" The
Court failed, however, to address the issue in the larger context of Title VII and the Act's
underlying policy objectives.
This section analyzes the majority's reasoning in Patterson. The validity and Inn-
itations of each of the dissents is discussed. It is maintained that, contrary to the majority's
reading of section 703(h), the language of that section does not provide a dispositive
guide to determining the true scope of the protection that Congress intended to provide
seniority systems. It is submitted that the language of section 703(h) is ambiguous as to
this issue and that, in accordance with established principles of statutory construction, it is
herefore necessary to read that section in the context of both the legislative history of
section 703(h) and Title VII as a whole to ascertain the Congressional intent behind the
proviso. It is argued that proper consideration of these factors results in a less expansive
reading of section 703(h) than that given by the Patterson Court. In addition, contrary to
he position taken by the majority, neither the Court's prior decisions nor national labor
policy adequately support the Court's interpretation of section 703(h). Finally, it is
concluded that construing the language of section 703(h) in the context of t he legislative
history ofthat section and in the context of the Act as a whole, leads to the conclusion that.
Congress only intended to protect those seniority systems adopted prior to the enact-
ment of Title VII from the Act's broad prohibitions against discriminatory employment
pract ices.
2 " 401 U.S. at 429-30.
212 Id. at 431.
213 id.
214 Sec supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
2 " 456 U.S. at 75-76.
216
 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
217
 See Patterson, 456 U.S. at 75 - 76.
21 ' See id. at 6t-69.
2 " Id. at 75-76.
2215
 Id. at 76.77.
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A. The Flaws of American Tobacco Company e. Patterson
The major issue underlying the interpretation of section 703(h) concerns the extent
to which Congress was willing to limit the broad mandate of Title VII prohibiting all
forms of discriminatory employment practices in order to protect the expectations of
third party employees that arise under the operation or seniority- systems. This question is
particularly perplexing because the interests of two innocent groups, discrimination
victims and third party employees, neither of which is responsible for discriminatory
employment practices, are in direct conflict. On the one hand, a court-ordered revision of
a seniority system could significantly dilute the expectations of those nontninority em-
ployees who had worked for a company a number of years, assuming the seniority system
in place would protect them from layoffs and provide increasing job benefits. On the
other hand, if' the victims of prior discrimination arc not allowed to challenge seniority
systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, then Title VI I's promise of
equal employment opportunities and eradication of discriminatory employment practices
may remain unfulfilled for large numbers of minority employees.
As in all cases of statutory' construction,'"' the starting point for discerning the
balance that Congress had struck between these two competing interests is the language
employed by Congress. The Patterson Court began its analysis of section 703(h) by stating
that the precise language of this section was of particular importance as a guide to its
meaning due to the unusual cant taken in the drafting of Title V1I.' 22 The Court noted
that section 703(h) was introduced as part of' the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise bill'
which, according to its coauthor, Senator Dirksen, represented "months of labor," 224
during which time the authors had "tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma,
and of the shading of every phrase."'2 a Having thus stressed the importance of the
language of section 703(h), the Court proceeded to confine its analysis of the language of
this section to the observation that on its face, section 703(h) does not distinguish between
pre-Act and post-Act. seniority systems.'" The Court considered this observation to be
determinative of the issue at bar by noting that Congress had expressly employed
grandfather clauses in other sections of Title VII. 227 If Congress had intended section
703(h) to distinguish between pre and post-Act seniority Systems, the Court wrote, it
would have employed a similar clause.'" Because it did not choose to do so, the reasoning
maintains that section 703(h) cannot be construed as distinguishing between seniority
systems based on time of adoption. 229
In its analysis of the language of section 703(h), the Patterson Court failed to follow its
own advice to heed the "shading of every phrase,'" employed in the statute. In particu-
lar, the Court failed to address the use of the word "bona fide" as qualifying those
seniority systems that are entitled to the protection of section 703(h). In Teamsters, the
Court did note that section 703(h) requires a seniority system to be both "bona fide" as well
221 Id. at 68 (quoting Reiter v, Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979),
2" 456 U.S, :it 68-69.
223 SN, supra notes 42-56 and accompanying tem.
224 456 U.S. at 68 (quoting 110 CoNG. Rrc, 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)).
225 456 U.S. at 69 (quoting 110 CONC. REc. 1 1935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)).
220
 456 U.S. at 69.
2" Id. The Court cited 42	 § 2000e-(b) (1976 and Supp. I V 1980) as an example of such a
clause. So ,orprn note 167.
220 456 U.S. at 69.
220 Id.
230 id
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as not intentionally discriminatory to fall within the protection of that section?'" but then
failed to give that term a definition distinct. from that of "intentionally discriminatory."
After rejecting the government's definition of bona fide," 2 the Teamsters. Court held that
the seniority system in question was "entirely bona fide," 2 " because it applied equally to
members of all races, was rational and in accord with industry practice, consistent with
precedents of the National Labor Relations Board, and did not have its genesis in racia l
discrimination."' These same factors are the very ones that the Court has adopted;
subsequent to Teamsters, in Pullman-Standard, Inc, v. Swint"' as the yardstick by which to
determine if a seniority system is intentionally discriminatory. 2" The Court, therefore,
has equated 'bona fide' with 'not. intentionally discriminatory' for the purposes of section
703(h). In doing so, the decisions in Teamsters and Swint, when read in conjunction, have
made the clause requiring that seniority systems be bona fide redundant with the clause
requiring seniority systems to he not intentionally discriminatory. Consequently, rather
t han having to meet two separate conditions in order to come within the ambit of section
703(h), a seniority system need only meet one set of criteria. By tailing to further define
he requirement that a seniority system he bona fide to be protected by section 703(h), and
in effect accepting the Teamsters holding, the Patterson Court has rendered the bona fide
clause meaningless. This result is particularly ironic given the Court's emphasis on the
precise wording of the statute."'
This treatment of the bona fide clause is somewhat of a departure from prior
interpretations. The term had previously been considered to have particular significance
by the first decade of circuit and district court decisions construing section 703(h). 23 '
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that for a seniority system to he
protected by section 703(h), it must he bona fide as well as not intentionally discrimina-
tory."" In addition, the majority's failure to give substance to the term bona fide for the
purposes of section 703(h) runs contrary to the canon of statutory construction that
231
 431 U.S. at '353. See also Farms, 431 U.S. at 560 ("Since respondent does not attack the bona
lides of United's seniority system and since she makes no charge that the system is intentionally
designed to discriminate . . . § 703(h) provides an additional ground for rejecting her claim.").
232 431 U.S. at 353. The Justice Department had argued that no seniority system that per-
petuates prior discrimination can he bona fide for purposes of section 703(h). Id.
233 Id. at 355.
234 Id, at 355-56.
23' 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
"5 See id. at 279-82. In Swint, the Court cited with approval the test developed by the Fifty
Circuit in Times v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), for determining if a
seniority system is intentionally discriminatory. Relying on the criteria that the Teamsters Court
deemed relevera for assessing the bona fides of the seniority system in dispute in Teamsters, the Fifth
Circuit held that in determining 'la seniority system is intentionally discriminatory, the court should
look at "the totality of the circumstances in the development and maintenance of the system," id. at
351-52, with particular emphasis on the following factors: whether the system "operates to discour-
age all employees equally from transferring between seniority units," the rationality of the de-
partmental structure upon which the seniority system relies in light of the general industry practice,
"whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination," and "whether the system was
negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose."Id. at 352. A thorough discussion
of the standards for demonstrating that a seniority system is intentionally discriminatory for the
purposes of section 703(b) is beyond the scope of this casenote.
2" See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
23 ' See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
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effect should be given to each word of a statute to the greatest extent. possible."'"
Although the Court stressed primary reliance on the statutory language of section
703(h) in construing that provision, the majority's analysis of the language of section
703(h) however, is, as previously discussed, incomplete for it fails to define the term
'bona fide.' The use of the term 'bona fide' in section 703(h) creates an ambiguity in that
provision, as the intended meaning of that term is not apparent. from the language of the
statute. The term 'hona fide' did not arise in any of the Congressional debates surround-
ing Title VI l's potential effect on seniority systems."' Nor does the Act. itself define this
term. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the plain language of section 703(h) and
examine the legislative history of that section to ascertain the intended meaning of that
section.
The Court rejected the argument expressed by the Fourth Circuit that the basis for a
distinction between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems could he found in the legisla-
tive history of section 703(h), if not on the face of that section.'" The lower court had
pointed to statements in the legislative history that Title VII would not effect "estab-
lished,"24s or "existing," 244 seniority rights. The Court declared that these statements
could not he treated as authoritative indications of the intended meaning of section
703(h) because they were addressed to specific claims made by Title VI I's critics that the
Act would destroy already existing seniority rights. 245 In contrast, the Court noted
that other statements could be found in the legislative history speaking of seniority alone,
not "existing - seniority rights."" The Court particularly relied on the statement made on
the Senate floor that "the bill would not affect seniority at all. "247 to support its interpreta-
tion of section 703(h) as making no distinction between pre and post-Act seniority
systems.248
The basis for rejecting those portions of the legislative history that support the
conclusion that Congress sought to protect only those seniority rights and expectations
that had been developed prior to the adoption of Title VII, and thus only those seniority
systems adopted prior to the Act, is rather strained. The recognition that the supporters
240 See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 529, 538 - 39 (1955); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1882); Tabor v. Ulloa, 323 F.2d 823, 824 (9th Cir. 1963); Donaldson, Hoffman &
Goldstein v. Gaudio, 260 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1958); Skovgaard v. The M.V. Tungus, 252 F.2d
14, 17 (3rd Cir. 1957) ("It is presumed that the legislature did not employ useless verbiage and that
each word has independent meaning."). See also C. SANDS, SrATurEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
See Note, Lao Hind, First Fired Layoffs and Title v11, 88 Hary. L. Rev. 1544, 1550 (1975).
242 456 U.S. at 75. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 (4th Cir. 1980).
243 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting 110 Cost.
Rec. 7213 (1964) (Clark-Case Interpretive Memorandum)). See supra note 51 for the text of the
Memorandum.
Id. (quoting 110 CoNG,	 7207 (1964) (justice Department Memorandum). See supra note
52 for the text of' the Memorandum.
242 456 U.S. at 74.
248 Id . (citing 110 Coxe. REC. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark), 110 CLING. REC. 7217 (1964)
(Clark-Case Questions and Answers); 110 CoNc. Rec. 5423 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 110
CoNo. Rec. 6564 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); 110 Com .... REc. 6565-66 (1964) (Memorandum
prepared by House Republican Sponsors); 110 CoNG. Rre. 11768 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
McGovern); 110 Cow. .. Rec. 14329 (1964) (letter from Senator Dirksen to Senator Williams); 110
CONG. REC. 14331 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams)). For the text of the Clark-Case Questions and
Answers, see supra note 51.
247 456 U.S. at 74 (quoting 110 CMG. REC. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark)).
24 ' 456 U.S. at 71, 75.
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of Title VII were seeking to appease the concerns of the Act's opponents suggests that the
drafters of section 703(h) were likewise only attempting to meet the limited objections
raised to the effect that the Act would destroy rights based on seniority systems adopted
prior to Title VII, and were not attempting to carve out a broad exception to the Act. The
Court had previously stated in Tranaters that section 703(h) was drafted to rebut the
criticism by the Act's opponents that Title VII would destroy seniority rights that had
accrued prior to the effective date of Title VI i." 4 ° Reading the legislative history in this
context supports the conclusion that the drafters of that section did not intend for section
703(h) to he any broader than necessary to meet the objections of their opponents. 2 '" In
addition, the Court's reliance on those statements in the legislative history that Title Vii
would not affect seniority at all, seems somewhat misplaced. As the Court itself noted,
these statements are not entirely accurate because seniority rights are affected when a
plaintiff in a Title Vii case is awarded retroactive seniority as a remedy for unlawful
discrimination."' In addition, section 703(h) by its terms, permits interference with
seniority systems that are intentionally diseriminatory.' 52
Given the differing remarks appearing in the legislative history, a better approach
for discerning the Congressional intent behind section 703(h) would be to view the
various remarks made about the effect of Title VII on seniority systems in the context of
the debates giving rise to these comments. The legislative history of section 703(h)
contains discussions of the potential effects of Title Vii on plant-wide seniority systems,
those which measure seniority by total length of service with an employer, containing a
last-hired. first-fired provision.'" In contrast. a review of the legislative history of section
706 reveals no reference to those seniority systems which measure seniority by length of
service within a particular department or job and the effects of such systems on incum-
bent minority employees. For example, t he remarks of Senator Clark stating that seniority
rights would be undisturbed by Title VII, quoted by the Patterson Court, were followed
with an example of last-hired, first-fired seniority."' Front these remarks, it appears that
Congress was addressing the situation in which an employer had refused to hire
minorities on discriminatory grounds prior to the adoption of Title VII but subsequently
hired the minority employee after the adoption of Title VII. In this situation, Senator
Dirksen stated that it would be permissible for the employer to lay off the newly hired
minority under a last-hired, first-fired provision despite the fact that the minority's low
ranking on the seniority hierarchy was due to the employer's past discrimination.'"'" To
reach a contrary conclusion, and require an employer to disregard the seniority ladder
that had been built prior to the enactment of Title VII, would in effect, provide minorities
with grants of seniority for periods beginning before the minority's employment, and
diminish the value of the seniority non minorities had accrued prior to the adoption of
Title VII. Given that the legislative history of section 703(h) only contains references to
the above situation which arises uncle'. plant-wide last-hired, first-fired provisions, the
"4" 431 U.S. at 352.
255 This conclusion is further supported by the remarks of Senator Humphrey made after the
introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen compromise bill that section 703(h) did not alter the scope of
Title VII, but rather, "clarified its present intent and effect.'' 110 CoNe.. Rm .:. 12723 (1964).
"' 456 U.S. at 74, n.15.
2 '12 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352-56.
'253 See, e.g.. Clark-Case Interpretive Memorandum, quoted at supra note 51 and Justice De-
partment Nlemorandum, quoted at supra note 52.
2 " 110 CONC. REC. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
25:,
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legislative history supports a finding that section 703(h) was intended to protect only
previously estahlished seniority rights.
In addition to relying on the plain language of section 703(h), the Patterson Court
found further support for its holding in both its prior decisions 2 " and in national labor
policy. 2" Neither of these grounds, however, provide a satisfactory rationale for the
Court's failure to recognize any distinction in section 703(h) between pre and post-Act
seniority systems. In Patterson, the Court. characterized section 703(h) as reflecting the
balance that Congress has struck between the policy of eliminating employment discrimi-
nation and that of "favoring minimal supervision by courts and other governmental
agencies over the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements." 2 j 8 This charac-
terization misstates the issue underlying section 703(h) by focusing on the collective
bargaining process rather than on the underlying rights and expectations of nonminority
employees under seniority systems produced by the collective bargaining process. 2 "
There is no evidence in the legislative history of a Congressional desire to protect
seniority systems in order to insulate the collective bargaining process, nor is there any
extrinsic policy that provides a convincing rationale for subordinating the interests of
discriminatces to a policy of freedom of collective bargaining. Title VII is expressly
applicable to labor unions as well as employers.'" As demonstrated by the facts in
Patterson, unions have engaged in intentional and invidious racial discrimination.'" In
addition, as the Court stated in Franks, seniority systems are not inviolate and may be
modified by statute in furtherance of public policy objectives.°" Similarly, the Court has
rejected arguments that grants of retroactive seniority to victims of discrimination im-
permissibly punish the union that negotiated that seniority system rather than punish the
employer, the true wrongclocr. 263
I 11 addition to relying on national labor policy, the Patterson Court found further
support for its holding in its prior decisions. As the Court stated, Teamsters and Evans
stand for the proposition that section 703(h) immunizes all bona fide seniority systems
that are not intentionally discriminatory despite the system's effect of perpetuating either
pre-Act or post-Act discrimination.'" Neither Teamsters nor Evans, however, specifically
addressed the issue of whether or not section 703(h) insulates both pre- and post-Act
seniority systems. 265 The Court did note in Patterson that the Teamsters Court did not
discuss the date of adoption of the seniority system in dispute.'" Much of the reasoning
employed in Teamsters, however, does suggest that the Teamsters Court was addressing a
pre-Act seniority system. Teamsters relied heavily on those statements in the legislative
2" 456 U.S. at 75 -76 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, Ri (1977); Evans,
431 U.S. at 533; Tamisters, 431 U.S. at 348 n.30,
" 7 456 U.S. at 76-77.
" 8 Id.
269 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
260
	 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976 & Stipp. IV 1980).
2"t
	 U.S. at 65. For example, prior to 1963 the collective bargaining representative of the
hourly-paid production workers, the Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Worker's International
Union, maintained segregated locals at the American Tobacco Company's two plants. Id.
262 424 U.S. at 778.
243 Zipes v. Trans Vtrorld Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398
-400.
264
	 U.S. at 75-76. See Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348 n.30, 349.
2" Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980).
266 456 U.S. at 76 n.16.
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history referring to "established," 267 and "existing," 2 " seniority rights.'" The Teamsters
Court concluded that section 703(h) was drafted to allow for "full exercise of seniority
accumulated before the effective date of the Act . . . . The Congressional judgment was that. Title
VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water clown
the vested seniority rights of employees . . ." 270 In essence, therefore, prior decisions
provide no explicit. guidance leading to the conclusion that post-Act systems should fall
under section 703(h); rattler, they seem to suggest that such systems could not be so
protected.
In his dissenting opinion in Patterson, Justice Stevens observed that the majority's
liberal construction of section 703(h) appeared to have been motivated by a concern that
were section 703(h) interpreted to allow a prima facie case against the validity of a
post-Act seniority system to be established by a showing of disparate impact, mass
invalidation of seniority systems would follow."' Justice Stevens noted that this would
not, however, be the inevitable result, for 'wouldthe business necessity defense   be
available to protect those seniority systems that are related to a valid business purpose. 273
Justice Steven's analysis would seem to dispose of the objection that applying the
disparate impact standard to seniority systems would threaten all seniority systems.
According to the majority, another objection remains to allowing post-Act seniority
systems to be challenged on t he basis of disparate impact, that of undue interference with
the collective bargaining process.'" Concerns about government intrusion into the collec-
tive bargaining process, however, do not justify insulating all but intentionally discrimina-
tory seniority systems from the reach of Title VII. Given the purpose of collective
bargaining to provide workers with a voice in the terms of their employment. and the
purpose of Title VII to eradicate discriminatory employment. practices, 2 " an approach
consistent with both these policies would be to allow an examination and subsequent
invalidation of those provisions in a post-Act seniority system that have an adverse impact
on minorities while serving no legitimate business purpose. That is, to allow the applica-
tion of the Griggs standard to post-Act systems. Those seniority systems that further only
the interests of non-minority employees, rather than those of all employees to the greatest.
extent possible, are consistent with neither the goals of Title VII nor those of union
representation of employees. Although Patterson does not leave union leadership the
discretion to engage in intentional discrimination, it does allow unions to negotiate
seniority systems without the necessity of considering the effect such systems may have on
t he union's minority members. This result. is the most. disturbing consequence of Patterson.
This neglect of the interests of minority employees could have been avoided had the
majority recognized the ambiguity in the language of section 703(h), particularly the
ambiguity created by the term 'bona fide.' In the alternative, the Court might have sought.
267
 1 JO CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Clark-Case Interpretive Memorandum).
' 110 Cost:. REc. 7207 (1964) ( Justice Department Memorandum).
269 See 431 U.S. at 350-52.
27° Id. at 352 -53 (emphasis added). The EEOC interpreted Teamsters as not addressing the
applicability o f section 703(h) to post-Act seniority systems. See EEOC Notice N 915 ( July 14, 1977),
reprinted in EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 6500 (section 703(h) has no applicability to seniority systems
adopted subsequent to the effective date of Title VII). At least one other ummienuator has similarly
read Teamsters as inapplicable to post-Act seniority systems. See Note, 52 TULANE L. REV. 397, 405
(1978).
271 456 U.S. at 89.
272
 See supra note 210.
456 U.S. at 89-90.
274 Id. at 76-77.
' 7 ' See suprez notes 2-14 and accompanying text.
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to resolve this ambiguity by construing section 703(h) in the larger context of Title VII,
and by following the canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes are to be
interpreted liberally, and exceptions thereto interpreted narrowly."' The Court has
emphasized in a long line of cases the broad remedial nature of Title VII, 2" and has
intoned that other exceptions and defenses to Title VII are to be applied strictly. 278 It
cannot he explained, therefore, why section 703(h) should not be construed in a similar
fashion.
In its treatment of section 703(h), the Court has also departed from precedent by
failing to construe that section in the context of the larger policy objectives of Title VII.
For example, Griggs, itself created the disparate impact standard 27 " for establishing a
prima facie violation of Title VII by basing its reasoning on the broad objectives of the Act
to eliminate all forms of employment discrimination, rather than in the precise language
used in any particular provision of Title V11. 280 The Griggs Court noted that the Con-
gressional objective behind Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove harriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees."' The Court held, therefore, that Title V11
prohibits not only intentionally dscriminatory employment practices, but also those neu-
tral practices that operate to maintain the slat us quo of prior discrimination."' Similarly,
in United Steelworkers (.1 America v. Weber, 2" the Court upheld an affirmative action plan
favoring minority employees for entrance into a crafts training program despite the fact.
that it discriminated against white employees. The Court emphasized that Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination must. be read "against the background of the legislative
history of Title VII and the historical context from which t he Act arose,'  4 and upheld
the affirmative action plan because its goal of removing discriminatory employment
harriers that had relegated blacks to inferior positions, mirrored the goals of Title V11. 28 '
Viewing section 703(h) in the context of Title VII as a whole supports a narrower
construction of section 703(h), than that provided by the Patterson Court. Title VII is a
broad remedial statute prohibiting all forms of discritnitratory employment practices."""
See, e.g., Piedmont	 Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932); Spokane &
Inland R. Co. v. United States, 24l U.S. 344, 350 (1916); United States v. Dickson 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
141, 165 (1841).
" 7 See, e.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 763; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
27" e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), construing the bona fide occupation
qualification exception to Title VII as "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 334.
2" See supra note 94.
28° See 401 U.S. at 429-36. The Griggs Court concluded that an employer may not require a
high school diploma or a passing grade on an intelligence test as a prerequisite to employment where
a smaller percentage of blacks than whites could meet these requirements, when such requirements
are not necessary for adequate job performance. Id. at 431-32, 436. In reaching this holding, the
Court noted that although remarks could be found in the legislative history stating that under Title
V11 an employer may set his job qualifications as high as he pleased, see 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)
(Clark-Case Interpretive Memorandum), subsequent statements indicated that such qualifications
must he related to the job in question. 401 U.S. at 434 n.11.
2x'
	 U.S. at 429-30.
2 " 2 Id. at 430.
"3 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
2"4 Id. at 201,
2"3 Id. at 208.
28" See supra note 4.
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"The framers of that Act. considered economic equality and access to employment oppor-
tunities unfettered by discriminatory barriers to be both a practical as well as a moral
necessity. 2 " In addition, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII is part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme seeking to eliminate discrimination in public accommo-
dalions," 8 public facilities, 2" education,"" and in voting rights"' as well as in employ-
ment. The Congress' that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 thus recognized that
discrimination and racial stratification is a persistent and nationwide problem. Employ-
ment discrimination was viewed as a particularly critical link in the chain of interrelated
factors contributing to the continuation of discrimination in American society. 2 H 2 These
objectives of Title VII and the canon of statutory construction that exceptions to remedial
statutes should be strictly construed provide the foundation for construing the somewhat
ambiguous language of section 703(h) as intended to protect only those seniority systems
adopted prior to Title VII from a challenge based on the disparate impact standard.
B. An Alternative Construction of Section 703(h): Recognizing the Requirement that a
Seniority System be Bona Fide.
The construction of section 703(h) advocated by Justice Stevens provides an interpre-
tation of that provision that is both grounded in the language of the statute, and is
consistent with the broad policy objectives of Title VII. justice Stevens observed that
section 703(h) requires a seniority system to be both bona fide and not intentionally
discriminatory in order to be insulated from Title VII. 2 " 3 In order to be bona fide, he
continued, a seniority system must he legal at the time of its adoption.'' Consequently,
those seniority systenis adopted prior to Title VII and its prohibition against employment
practices both discriminatory in intent or in effect, would not he subject to the disparate
impact standard, while those seniority systems adopted after the enactment of Title VII
would have to meet the same standards as other employment practices.'"
As Justice Stevens also stated, invalidation of a seniority system would not automat-
ically follow a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate impact.'" Rather,
only those seniority systems with a disparate impact that are not related to a valid business
purpose. Would be found to violate Title VII. 2 " 7
 In contrast, allowing those post-Act
seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, and thus per-
petuate racial stratification and invidious barriers to equal employment opportunities, to
2
" 7 Teamsters. 431 U.S. at 388 (Marshall J., dissenting) (citing 110 CoNc. RFC. 6547 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6562 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 7203-04 (remarks of Sen.
Clark); H.R. REP, No. 914. pi.. 2. 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26- 29 (1963)).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-a(6) (1976 and Stipp. IV 1980).
299
 42 U.S.C. fill 2000b-b(3) (1976 and Stapp. IV 1980).
249 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c -2000c - 9 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
7" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(2)(A)-(c) (1976 and Stipp. IV 1980).
2"2
	 e.g., Weber, 943 U.S. at 202-03; 110 CONG. Ric. 6547 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Hum-
phrey) ("What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot aflOrd to pay
the bill? What good does it do hint to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his modest
income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage of integrated educational
facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he can use that education?").
"" 2 456 U.S. at 89:90, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 87-88. 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
2'S Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 " Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 -521.
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remain unchallenged when such seniority systems do nut serve a valid business purpose is
inconsistent with Title VII's goal of eliminating employment discrimination.
A construction of section 703(h) which protects pre but not post-Act seniority systems
admittedly would work some hardships on third party employees whose expectations of
increased employment benefits with increased length of service were developed under
post-Act seniority systems. This interpretation, however, would not mean total abrogation
of the fundamental objectives of seniority systems; namely to increase employment
benefits as length of service increases and to provide protection from arbitrary manage-
ment decisions with respect. to the distribution of scarce benefits. 2 " A revised seniority
system could still serve these purposes by recomputing seniority benefits by length of
service while also providing recognition for the time spent by minorities in those positions
to which they were assigned because of their minority status. Thus, the seniority rights of
nonminority employees could therefore be diluted, but would not be totally destroyed.
This same result occurs when a successful plaintiff in a Title VII action is awarded
retroactive seniority. The award of retroactive seniority, particularly in large class actions,
can significantly lower a nonminority's position on the seniority ladder. Yet, this result was
considered an insufficient rationale for denying an award of retroactive seniority by the
Franks Court.'" In Franks, the Court noted that sharing t he burdens of prior discrimina-
tion is "presumptively necessary,'° ° and that "Iilf relief under Title VII can be denied
merely because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination,
will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act
is clirected." 3 "
Indeed, the Court's construction of section 703(h), when juxtaposed with the Frattir,v
holding that a victim of employment discrimination is presumptively entitled to retroac-
tive seniority," 2 creates something of an anomaly within Title VII. Under Franks, retroac-
tive seniority may be granted to minorities, and thus the seniority rights of nonminorities
are diminished following a finding that an employer engaged in illegal discrimination
either intentionally or by the use of a neutral employment practice with a discriminatory
impact. 303 Nonetheless, under Patterson, when a seniority system is challenged directly,
the seniority system, and the seniority interests of third party employees, can only be
disrupted if the system is intentionally discriminatory. It is in the latter situation, however,
where employees through the vehicle of union representation, have some opportunity to
prevent the creation and adoption of seniority systems that will operate in a discrimina-
tory manner. The application of the Griggs standard, that is, allowing challenges to
post-Act seniority systems which have a disparate adverse impact upon minorities, would
place such an affirmative burden upon unions and employers while allowing for reason-
able protection for the expectations of nonminority employees.
2"8 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
2" 424 U.S. at 773-75.
30" Id. at 777.
'"' Id. at 775 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,663 (2d Cir. 1971)).
302 424 U.S. at 779 n.41.
313 Franks held that victims of illegal hiring discrimination are entitled to grants of retroactive
seniority, and did not distinguish between violations of Title VII based on intentional discrimination
and violations based on the use of a neutral employment practice with a disparate impact on women
or minorities. 1(1.
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CONCLUSION
Congress was prompted, in part, to enact Title VII because of its concern over the
disproportionate rate of unemployment and under-employment among minorities. 3 " It
was thought that if discriminatory practices were eliminated, all groups would attain
equality in employment opportunities. 305 The Patterson holding that section 703(h) pro-
tects both pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems front attacks based on the disparate
impact standard, restricts the utility of Title VII as a weapon against barriers to equal
employment opportunities. Patterson will prevent minorities continuing to suffer the
effects of prior discriminatory employment practices through the operation of seniority
systems that. restrict. advancement, from realizing the benefits sought to be achieved by
Title VII. This result, based on the Court's liberal interpretation of section 703(h), is
inconsistent with the objectives of Title VII and finds little support in either the Court's
strict adhesion to the plain language of section 703(h) or in the policy of respecting the
insular nature of collective bargaining. An interpretation of section 703(h) that recognizes
that by its terms, section 703(h) requires a seniority system to be bona fide, with bona fide
defined as legal at time of adoption, would avoid the harsh result of Palterson and further-
the objectives of Title VII.
TAMARA S. Woirsorc
3" Weber, 443 U.S. at 202. See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rae. 7270 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("The
rate of Negro unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with white unemployment for
the past 15 years. This is a social malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate. That is
one of the principle reasons why the bill shi)uhl pass. -).
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONC.. & Al) NEWS
2139.
